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N/A: Section 16(b): Blau v. Lamb--Purchase and Sale as an Indicator of

SECTION 16(b): BLAU V. LAMB'-"PURCHASE" AND
"SALE" AS AN INDICATOR OF JUDICIAL TRENDS
INTRODUCTION

Ideally the securities markets serve three functions: (1) to provide ready
marketability for corporate and municipal securities; (2) to provide prices
for securities commensurate with their investment value; and (3) to provide
a medium for the efficient channeling of the nation's capital into productive economic development. 2 It is perhaps the latter function which justifies
the very existence of organized security exchanges. 3
However, prior to 1929 and during the ensuing economic depression, the
national exchanges failed to fulfill these basic functions. One of the major
causes for this breakdown was the widespread manipulation of security
4
prices by organized pools created specifically for quick monetary gain.
Congressional inquiries conducted during 1933 and 1934 disclosed not only
that professional traders were involved in the manipulative pools, but also
that many corporate insiders were active partners in pools organized to

control the securities of their own corporation.5 Also disclosed by the
inquiries was the less sophisticated, but equally profitable, practice of
officers and directors of corporations unscrupulously capitalizing on the
employment of information obtained by their inside position.0 The result
1 Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir., June 27, 1966.
2 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 19-32 (1935).
3 Id. at 32. The picture is not complete until it is considered that the organized exchanges have a substantial influence on the investment capital that flows into the multitude of unlisted securities, because, to a certain degree, it is by the action on the
organized exchanges that the prices and values of the unlisted securities are determined.
BERLE & MEANs, TuE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 297 (1932); see Moore
& Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. Cni. L. REv. 46 (1934).
Thus, when the demand for securities increases on the organized exchanges, this necessarily generates a demand for unlisted securities.
4 S. REp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934).
5 S. RP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d

Sess. 55-68 (1934).
6 Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, market trading on

inside information was probably one of the largest sources of income to management
and other insiders. Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibition Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947). The most profitable form

of insider information was generally concerned with the increase, resumption or passing
of dividends. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66

HARV. L. REV. 385, 386 (1953). See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), for
glaring examples of the profitable use of such information. The profits derived from
this type of "sure thing" speculation were generally considered a part of the compensation for serving as an officer or director of a corporation. 2 Loss, SEcURITIEs REcULATION 1037 (2d ed. 1961).
There is little doubt that the common law was inadequate to insure an orderly
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of these practices was a generated speculation; a speculation based not on
future worth, but rather an excessive and irrational speculation that ultimately disrupted the flow of credit and dislocated industry.7
It was against this background that the Securities Exchange Act of 19348
was enacted. 9 Its purpose was to purge the security exchanges of existing
abuses 10 and to secure the restoration of business confidence and the return
of investment capital. 1 Basically, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
securities market. See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 Mfien. L. REV. 133, 143-44 (1939).
The problem was too large and the remedies provided placed an almost unsurmountable burden of proof upon the injured shareholder. The strict common law rule, as
applied in the majority of the state courts, held that there was no fiduciary obligation
between the officers and directors of a corporation and its shareholders. See the leading
case of Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868). It was felt that if buyers and
sellers dealt at arm's length through the medium of a securities market, each party
should be free to determine for himself his best course of action. Goodwin v. Agassiz,
283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Even under the exceptions to this rule, i.e., the
special facts doctrine enunciated in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), and the
fiduciary or minority rule enunciated in Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903)
and Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904), the duty recognized failed to
curb many of the abuses because the limited duty imposed extended only to those who
were already shareholders. See Cook & Feldman, supra at 408-10.
7 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
5 (1934).
8 The necessity for the regulation of the securities exchanges is set forth in § 2 of
the act:
... transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest which makes
it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions . . . in order
to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to
protect and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets ....
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
9 Prior to the Great Depression, the security markets were largely unregulated by
the Government and consequently the participants in the market were left to their
own moral standard. This is not to say that regulation was not considered and attempted. The 1907 panic led to a state investigation in New York while the depression
of 1913 set off a congressional investigation. However, in both of these economic setbacks prosperity quicky returned to the nation and for the most part the matter of
regulation was forgotten. The depression of 1920 led to another congressional inquiry
which resulted in limited federal regulation of the grain markets. With this background,
there is little doubt that the federal investigations which followed the Great Depression
of 1929 would have had simliar results had the economic conditions not worsened. See
Hanna, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CAmIF. L REV. 1, 10 (1934).
10 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
68 (1934). See Moore & Wiseman, supra note 3, at 46-47, where the authors state the
objectives of the act to be threefold: (1) curb excessive speculation, (2) provide adequate
information to the investing public, and (3) prevent the manipulation of sock prices.
1 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. Rxp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 81 (1934).
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provides for the disclosure of material facts to the public, for the control of
fraud and manipulation in securities trading, for the regulation of the
securities markets, and for the control of credit that may be extended for
14
13
investments in the markets. 12 Section 16 of the act provides for insider
disclosures and the control of manipulation in insider trading. Specifically,
section 16(a) requires periodic disclosure of the insider's trading activities
in the stock of his own corporation. 1 Section 16(b) provides that any profits
inuring to an officer, director or ten percent beneficial owner from any "purchase" and "sale" or any "sale" and "purchase" of an equity security of
the corporation within any six month period is recoverable by the corporation irrespective of any intent of the insider.10 Section 16(c) prohibits the
12 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 130-31

(2d ed. 1961);

TWENTiETr

CENTURY FUND, op.

cit. supra note 2, at 702.
13 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
14 The term "insider" as used hereinafter refers to any person who is directly or

indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity security
or who is an officer or director of the issuer of any equity security. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1964); note 15 infra.
'5 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964). This provision states:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 78 of this title, or who is a director or
an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration
of such security on a national exchange or by the effective date of a registration
statement filed pursuant to section 78(g) of this title, or within ten days after
he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission . ..of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he Is the
beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file
with the Commission ...a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the
calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such
calendar month.
Ibid.

It was felt that if the trading activities of the insider were made public, the practice
of using inside information for personal gain would be discontinued. Cook & Feldman,
supra note 6, at 386.
16 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). The pertinent portion of this section provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . .within any period of less
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with
a debt previouly contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer
in entering into such transaction ....
Ibid.

This provision is, of course, the true deterrent to insider short swing trading. If all
possibility for profit is removed, there remains no motive to enter into such a transaction. See Cook & Feldman, supra note 6, at 387.
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insider from short selling and selling against the box.17 It is section 16(b)
that serves as the "blunt instrument" to deter the insider from the use of
information he may have obtained by reason of his position. This section
was not intended to be penal in nature and has been correctly interpreted
by the courts to be remedial.'s But despite this remedial interpretation,
the earlier court decisions applied a harsh rule. In Sm olowe v. Delendo
Corp.,19 the first significant judicial decision interpreting section 16(b), the
court concluded that:
the statute was intended to be thorough-going, to squeeze all possible
profits out of stock transactions, and thus to establish a standard so
high as to prevent any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary
officer, director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his
duty.20
It was admitted that bona fide transactions may be "caught in the net of
the Law" but the court felt it was a small price to pay for an objective
measure of proof 2' and a simple cause of action.22
'7

15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1964).

(2d Cir. 1959).
19 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
20 Id. at 239.
21 The Securities Exchange Act does provide an exemption that rests upon a sub.
jective measure of proof. Liability for profits realized may be avoided if "such security
was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1964). This exemption was first considered in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
supra note 20, where a stock acquisition by the debtor insider to discharge a debt was
held not within the meaning of the exemption. However, the stock received by the
creditor was exempt because to hold otherwise would deprive the creditor of the pay.
ment benefits. This defense has been pleaded, and rejected, in almost all reported cases.
E.g., Park & Tilford v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947). It was accepted in one other case. In Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473
(9th Cir. 1961), the defendant elected to receive his retirement bonus in corporate stock.
The- defendant pledged the stock and it was subsequently sold by the defendant's pledgee
within six months. In considering the good faith of the defendant, the court said that
the election toaccept stock rather than cash, insurance or annuities was but one factor
to be considered, in determining the defendant's good faith. The Rheern decision appears well within the Smolowe interpretation of what is a debt previously contracted;
however, it has extended the application of this exemption when contrasted with the
"stock option" case of Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). In
Truncale the defendant was issued warrants to purchase the company's stock as part
consideration for his employment. The court held the acquisition of the warrants not
within the statutory exemption. It would seem there is little difference between an
acquisition of warrants and an acquisition of stock when they are both issued for prior
services. But the obligation was held not to be a debt within the meaning of § 16(b) in
Truncale while it was held to be one in Rheem.
22 Undoubtedly, the simplicity of § 16(b) and its objective burden of proof has been
a substantial deterrent to short swing trading. However, the number of cases involving
§ 16(b) does not give an accurate guide to the number of actual recoveries that have taken
18 E.g., Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259
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The purpose of this Note is to determine the trends in judicial interpretation of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23 The courts'
treatment of the terms "purchase" and "sale" as defined by the act has been
chosen as the criteria for two reasons. First, the interpretation of these terms
has been the most litigated aspect of section 16(b). Second, the recent influx
of cases arising under this section has been concerned primarily with an
interpretation of these terms. For clarity, the analysis of the cases has been
divided into four categories: (1) conversion transactions; (2) gifts and other
dispositions; (3) reclassification, reorganization and other exchanges; and (4)
put and call options.

II.

PURCHASE AND SALE

The Securities Exchange Act broadly defines the terms "purchase" and
"sale." Thus, "the terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract
to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire" 24 and "the terms 'sale' and 'sell' each
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 25 Obviously such ambiguous and vague terminology can include almost any acquisition or
disposition of securities. However, whether or not a given transaction falls
within section 16(b) depends mainly on a judicial determination of statutory purpose and not on any concept of plain meaning. 20
A. Conversion Transactions
A conversion transaction involves the exchange of one security for another security. Typical of such a transaction is the exchange of convertible
preferred stock of a corporation for common stock in the same corporation
at a predetermined conversion rate. Generally, the option to convert is
held by the convertible security holder; however, frequently the issuing
corporation has reserved the right to terminate the conversion option after
a certain date. The leading case interpreting the terms "purchase" and
"sale" as applied to a conversion transaction is Park & Tillord, Inc. v.
Schulte.27 The defendants were trustees of a family trust which held a controlling interest in the common and convertible preferred stock of the
plaintiff corporation. The corporation gave notice of redemption to all
preferred stock shareholders. The defendants converted their preferred
place under the provision. Many recoveries go unrecorded as an insider recognizes he
has no alternative but to give up his short swing profits. 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 1043.
23 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
24 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1964).
26 E.g., Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949). But
see Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
27 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1966

5

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 10

SECTION 16(b)
stock to common stock and within six months sold the conversion securities. The court held the conversion constituted a purchase of the common
stock and imposed liability for the profit realized. It was reasoned that the
defendants did not own the common stock before the conversion, but they
did own it after the conversion, and thus, the transaction came dearly
within the statute which defines purchase to include "any contract to buy,
purchase or otherwise acquire."28 The court refused to entertain the defendant's forced conversion theory because the evidence showed the defendants had complete control of the plaintiff corporation and could have
prevented the passage of the redemption resolution, or rescinded it after
its passage. This decision clearly followed the approach taken in Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp.29 and laid the groundwork for the so-called "objective or
dogmatic" approach to conversion transactions.
The other line of authority, or the subjective approach, is derived from
the Sixth Circuit case of Ferraiolov. Newman.30 The defendant, a director
of Ashland Oil and Refining Co., acquired convertible preferred stock in
Ashland. About three years later, the corporation gave notice of redemption
of all outstanding convertible preferred. To prevent a nine dollar per
share loss, the defendant converted his preferred stock to common stock
and within six months sold a part of the common stock received in the
transaction. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the conversion constituted a purchase of the common stock within the meaning of
section 16(b). It was reasoned that the conversion was involuntary because
of the financial loss the defendant would have incurred had he not converted his stock. Also, the court was impressed that the defendant was inactive as a director, and had little control over the management of the
corporation. Of secondary importance was the fact that the conversion
privilege was undilutable and both the convertible securities and the conversion securities were readily marketable which made them economic
equivalents. These circumstances, the court concluded, made the transaction one which could not have lent itself to the practices section 16(b) was
enacted to prevent.
Although it has been said the Park & Tilford decision stands for the objective approach and the Ferraiolo decision represents the subjective approachS3 this is probably an oversimplification. The court in the Ferraiolo
case definitely took a more pragmatic view in its application of section
28 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1964).
29 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
30 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); 72 Hv. L REv.
1392 (1959); 11 STAN. L REv. 358 (1959); 36 U. DEr. UJ. 343 (1959); 107 U. PA. L Rr'.
719 (1959); 45 VA. L Riv. 123 (1959).
Si See Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156. 161-62 (3d Cir. 1965); Blau v. Lamb.
242 F. Supp. 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd in part, Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir., June 27,
1966.
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16(b), but the Park & Tilford case does not represent a true dogmatic approach because the court considered the defendants' forced conversion
theory as a valid issue. This consideration of the defendants' forced con,
version theory in the Park & Tilford decision must modify the court's
otherwise dogmatic rationale. This modification became positive case law
in Ferraiolo which seemingly represented the ideal factual situation for
narrowing the Park & Tilford doctrine.
It was not until 1965, in the Ninth Circuit case of Blau v. Max Factor
& Co.,8 2 that the courts again considered the purchase and sale issue in a
conversion transaction. In this case, the corporation had two classes of
common stock, Class A and Common. Both classes had equal voting rights,
similar rights on liquidation, both were fully transferable and neither
class was subject to redemption. The board of directors had the power to
declare a lesser dividend on the Common than the Class A. The defendants,
who owned a controlling interest in the corporation, converted their Common into Class A and within six months sold the converted securities. In
holding the conversion not to be a purchase within section 16(b), the court
reasoned that the "exchange of ... [Common for Class A] ... did not
interrupt the continuity of appellee's investment: it did not increase or
decrease the amount invested, or alter in any way the risk assumed long
years before."3 3 Despite the change in terminology, i.e., economic equivalence to continuity of investment risk, the Max Factor decision closely followed the rationale of Ferraiolo. However, the facts in Max Factor gave
the defendants a much stronger case than could have been made in either
Park & Tilford or Ferraiolo.An exchange of one equity security for another equity security within the Max Factor situation is more defensible
under any interpretation of section 16(b) than an exchange of a hybrid
security for an equity security. Convertible preferred stock simply represents a different investment than common stock because a convertible preferred security combines some characteristics of an equity security and
some characteristics of a debt security. Thus, it may well be that the facts
presented in Max Factorwould have precluded liability even had the Park
& Tilford court decided the case.
Although apparently rejected by the Ninth Circuit, the Park & Tillord
objective approach was adopted by a district court in the Eighth Circuit. In
Petteys v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 3 4 the plaintiff corporation called its
outstanding convertible preferred stock for redemption. The defendants,
directors of the corporation, converted their preferred stock to common
32 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); 26 U. Pn-r. L. REv. 870
(1965).
33 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892
(1965).
34 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
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stock which they sold within six months. The court rejected the defendants'
contention that since the preferred stock was protected against dilution
and closely followed the price of the common stock, the securities were
economic equivalents. The forced conversion doctrine was also rejected
even though the defendants did not control the corporation. The court
reasoned that regardless of whether the defendants acquired the common
stock by conversion or purchase, the sale of the common stock was voluntary and led to short term profits which section 16(b) prohibits. In Petteys
the defendants had a stronger case than was presented in Park & Tilford
because the defendants in Petteys did not have control of the corporation
and the conversion was forced as the preferred stock was called for redemption. Petteys offered a situation that was ideal for the application of the
forced conversion rule laid down in Ferraiolo, but this contention was
flatly rejected by the court. Further, the economic equivalence rationale
which was of primary importance in Max Factor, and of secondary importance in Ferraiolo,was similarly rejected.
Later in 1965, the Third Circuit rendered its first decision concerning a
conversion transaction under section 16(b). In Heli-Coil Corp. v. TVebster,35
the defendant, a director of the plaintiff corporation, purchased plaintiff's
convertible debentures. The debentures were convertible at the holders
option and callable by the corporation at any time. Within six months the
defendant converted the debentures and about eight months after the
original debenture acquisition, the conversion securities were sold. The
court held the conversion to be a sale of the debentures and a purchase
of the conversion securities. The court reasoned that Congress had intended
an objective test and purported to follow the standards set forth in Park
& Tilford. The argument that the securities involved were economic equivalents was rejected because this was a situation in which there was a trading
advantage in holding the common stock rather than the debentures. The
standards that were applied by the court went far beyond the approach
taken in Park 6 Tilford. By way of dictum, the court indicated that the
only transactions that could escape the operation of section 16(b) are those
expressly exempt by the statute itself or by the Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission. This dictum is consistent with the overtones
of the court that even the coerced conversion theory, the exemption probably provided in Park & Tilford and expressly adopted in Ferraiolo,would
not constitute a valid defense. While the court did justify its decision under
the economic equivalent theory, it did not indicate in any way that it agreed
with the reasoning of the doctrine.
In 1966, the Second Circuit rejected the Park & Tilford rationale and
adopted the more subjective approach taken in Max Factor and Ferraiolo.
35 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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In Blau v. Lamb,3 6 the defendants, insiders in Air-Way Industries, acquired
convertible preferred stock in Air-Way and within three months exercised
their option to convert the preferred stock to common stock. It was held
that the conversion was not a sale within the meaning of section 16(b).B7
It was said that, ".

.

. in order to avoid 'purposeless harshness' a court should

first inquire whether a given transaction could possibly tend to accomplish
the practices section 16(b) was designed to prevent."38 Thus, the court
refused to apply section 16(b) unless the transaction could, under any set
of circumstances, ,serve as a vehicle for unfair insider trading. The district
court in Lamb3 9 had held the defendants liable primarily for two reasons.
First, the involuntariness of the conversion that was so critical in the Ferraiolo case was not present because the defendants were in full control of
the corporation. Second, the defendants had acquired different risks and
advantages by the conversion because the common stock had greater voting
rights, dividends and marketability than the preferred stock. 40 The Second
Circuit, however, refused to consider these factors determinative of the real
issue in the case, i.e., whether the transaction in any way made possible the
unfair insider trading the section was designed to prevent. Under the
rationale of Lamb, a plaintiff seeking to recover profits under section 16(b)
will have to show that the transaction could have been used for advantageous short swing trading. As such, the decision clearly departs from the
rationale of Park& Tilford. Perhaps more important, however, is the court's
refusal to follow the earlier decisions which found certain factors to be
important such as: (1) voluntariness of the conversion, (2) lack of the
defendant's control of the corporation, and (3) economic equivalence of the
securities involved. 41 Thus, the Lamb court adopted a rationale that is
42
perhaps even more subjective than that announced in Ferraiolo.
Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir., June 27, 1966.
The Securities Exchange Commission urged a similar result but on the ground
that, although there was a sale of the Air-Way preferred, there was no profit realized.
Id. at n.25.
88 Blau v. Lamb, Civil No. 29940, at 2408, 2d Cir., June 27, 1966.
39 Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 17 S.C.L.Q. 620 (1965).
40 Although the district court found the defendants liable for the profits realized, it
used the more subjective approach of Ferraiolo in reaching its decision.
36
37

41 For example, the court in Max Factor considered the economic equivalence of the
securities involved and the continuity of the defendants' investment important factors
in deciding the applicability of § 16(b). Likewise, the Ferraiolo decision has been cited
for the propositon that the defendants' control of the corporation has a great bearing
upon the insider's liability. Petteys v. Northwest Air Lines Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D.
Minn. 1965). See also Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827
(1954) where the court reasoned that the cumulative effect of several factors established
that § 16(b) should not be applied to the transaction in question.
42 But see Blau v. Lamb, Civil No. 29940, n.15, 2d Cir., June 27, 1966. The court
stated that the absence of insider control does not totally explain Ferraiolo. Instead, the
rule of that case is that § 16(b) need not be applied to every transaction described In
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There was once a mild conflict in the governing rationale used in the

conversion cases. The more objective approach was represented by the
Park & Tilford case while the later Ferraiolodecision began the subjective
reasoning. However, in the last few years, this conflict has grown. On the
one hand, there are the truly dogmatic decisions in Heli-Coil and Petteys
while the recent Lamb decision has darified the more subjective rationale
advanced in Ferraiolo.It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit's
decision in Lamb has, by implication, discredited its prior decisions in
Smolowe and Park & Tilford while the rationale of these earlier cases has
been adopted and even broadened in the Heli-Coil and Petteys decisions.
B. Gifts and Other Dispositions
In 1948 a federal district court raised eyebrows by holding, in Truncale
v. Blumberg,4 3 that a gift of warrants to bona fide charities did not constitute
a sale within the meaning of section 16(b). The court thought it as absurd
to consider these gifts sales as it was to think the defendant donor had
realized a profit from the transaction44 In dictum the court went further
saying that it could not see why a bona fide gift to a relative or employee
would not come within this rule unless the donee was, in effect, the alter ego
of the donor.4 5 In a later case 46 arising out of the same controversy, this
dictum was picked up and applied without independent examination of
the statute in a situation in which a non-charitable donee sold the gift
securities within six months from the time they were acquired by the donor.
One year later the Second Circuit considered a similar non-charitable gift
situation. In Shaw v. Dreyfus,47 the defendant, a Celanese Corporation
director, received shareholder warrants48 which he later exercised. He made
its terms, Le., the same approach taken by the Lamb court. Other courts, however, have
intimated that Ferraiolo stands for the proposition that lack of insider control, along
with other factors favorable to the defendant, precludes liability. E.g., Pcttc)s v. Northwest Air Lines Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn. 1965).
43

80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).

The plaintiff argued that a profit had been realized because of the favorable tax
deduction afforded charitable gifts by the federal income tax laws. Id. at 890. The
court's rejection of this argument has drawn severe criticism. See 10 SiRAcUSa L. REY.
44

296 (1959); 62 H1uRv. L. R.v. 706 (1949).
45

The Securities and Exchange Commission in amicus curiae brief suggested two

alternatives for treating the non-charitable donee: (1) regard the transfer as a gift but
require the donee to stand in the same shoes as the donor, or (2) regard every noncharitable gift as a sale for the purposes of § 16(b). These suggestions were rejected
by the court. Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see 59 YAXz

L.J. 510, 527-30 (1950).
46 Truncale v. Blumberg, 83 F. Supp. 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
47 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cdr.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
,48 These warrants were rights to subscribe, at fifty dollars per share, for additional
stock on the basis of one share for each ten shares held. The warrants were mailed to
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gifts of the shares received to donees who did not dispose of the securities
within six months. The court applied the reasoning of the Truncale decision holding that a bona fide gift is not a transaction within the meaning of
section 16(b). The position taken by Truncale and Shaw has not lost force
by the passage of time. In Blau v. Albert,49 the court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment saying that while a charitable gift may not
be within the accepted meaning of a sale, an issue of fact existed of whether
the transaction was a bona fide gift or a mere sham.
It is apparent from these gift cases that it is the nature and relationship
of the donee to the donor, rather than the transaction itself, that determines
whether the gift transaction is a sale within section 16(b). Under the
Truncale dictum that was applied in both the second Truncale decision and
the Albert case, the plaintiff must come forth with proof that the gift was
not bona fide or that the donee was the alter ego of the donor. This necessarily injects an element of subjective proof into the statute which radically
departs from the rationale laid down in Smolowe and Park & Tilford. Since
no appellate court is committed to the Truncale dictum, the future of this
rule is still in doubt. But this departure from the objective tests does indicate a willingness of the courts to strictly construe section 16(b), at least in
a gift situation.
In 1965 the Eighth Circuit was faced with a factual situation that involved an unusual disposition of securities. In Western Auto Supply Co. V.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 0 the defendant, an insider in Western Missouri,
purchased shares in Western Missouri and within six months entered a
consent decree with the government in an anti-trust action which required
the defendant to dispose of a substantial block of its Western Missouri
stock. In holding that the disposition was a sale within the operation of
section 16(b), the court rejected the defendant's argument that the sale was
compelled by the impending anti-trust suit. The majority reasoned that the
mere pendency of an anti-trust action should not cast a different meaning
upon the term sale than its ordinary meaning, that is, a contract between
parties to pass rights in property for money. This recent decision represents
a complete return to the objective rationale of earlier cases. The court in
Western Auto Supply Co. completely disregarded the Ferraiolo test of
whether this was the type transaction the statute sought to proscribe. By
the shareholders on October 9, 1945 and were to expire unless exercised fifteen days
later.
49 157 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The court relied on Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d
140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949), for the controlling law. The defendant
pleaded that he had made a charitable donation of the shares of stock; however, the
reports filed by the defendant with the SEC pursuant to § 16(a) of the act indicated
the transfer as "sales made privately for investment."
50 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); 50 MINN. L. Rav. 970

(1966).
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applying the more subjective Ferraiolostandards, it could easily be said that
the impending anti-trust action, in effect, forced the defendant to dispose
of its holdings thus causing the transaction to fall outside the intent of section 16(b). Instead, the court looked to the literal meaning of the statute,
a rationale similar to that used in Heli-Coil and Petteys. In comparing the
Western Auto Supply Co. decision with the gift cases, the same conclusion
would have to be reached. Both have construed section 16(b) by looking
more to the plain meaning of the statute rather than to its purpose. This
appears so even though the defendants in the gift cases disposed of their
securities in a completely voluntary act while the defendant in Western
Auto Supply Co. had a moving force that made the disposition, if not mandatory, at least highly desirable. 51
C. Reclassification,Reorganizationand Other Exchanges
In Blau v. Hodgkinson,52 the first case to pass on the issue of whether
an exchange of securities is within section 16(b), a parent corporation
absorbed four of its subsidiaries. The defendants, directors of the parent
corporation, owned stock in the subsidiaries. Pursuant to the plan for
reorganization, the defendants exchanged their stock in the subsidiaries
for stock in the parent corporation. Within six months, they sold the
securities acquired in the exchange. In holding the receipt of the stock to
be a purchase within section 16(b), the court reasoned that the defendants
were not obligated to accept stock in the parent in exchange for their
subsidiary stock. Instead, the defendants had the alternative of demanding
the cash value of their subsidiary stock. But once the defendants accepted
the exchanged securities, they received a completely different security from
that surrendered. The stock exchanged had a value based on assets and
liabilities of four corporations while the securities received had a value
based on one corporation. Three years later, the Second Circuit again con51 Of course the motivating factor in the disposal of its Western Missouri stock may
have been the favorable sale price. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
348 F.2d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); see 50 NfINN. L. REV.

970 n.36 (1966). On the other hand, the motivating force may have been § 5 of the
Clayton Act, which provides that a final judgment or decree resulting from any civil
or criminal antitrust action instituted by the government which affirms that a defendant
has violated the antitrust laws is prima fade evidence as to all matters necessarily
proved in the Government's action; but that the statute does not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken. 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). Thus, a private litigant, claiming treble damages
under the Clayton Act, needs only to prove that the violation caused injury to his
business or property, and not the commission of the violation itself. This is a relatively
simple burden of proof which might have resulted in substantial recoveries against the
defendant had it not entered the consent decree.
52 100 F. Supp. 361 (SD.N.Y. 1951); 52 COLUm. L. REv. 535 (1952).
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sidered the exchange issue in Blau v. Mission Corp.58 and Roberts v. Eaton.-4
In the Mission Corp. decision, the defendant purchased over ten percent
of the stock in Tide Water Associated Oil Company and transferred it to a
subsidiary holding company established exclusively to hold the acquired
stock. In return, the defendant received two shares of subsidiary stock for
each share transferred to the subsidiary. The defendant then declared a
dividend to its stockholders with part of the stock received in the exchange.
The defendant subsequently purchased more Tide Water stock and within
six months made a similar exchange. The court held the first exchange
not to be a sale of the Tide Water stock. It was reasoned that the exchange
was merely a change in form because the subsidiary was wholly owned by
the defendant. However, the second exchange came within section 16(b)
because the public ownership of the subsidiary stock made the subsidiary
more than just the alter ego of the defendant.5 5 This was true even though
the value of the subsidiary stock was directly related to the value of the Tide
Water stock in that the two securities consistently sold at prices substantially different from their related values. Although Blau v. Modglinson
relied on the Smolowe and Park & Tilford decisions, the court departed
from the "the defendant did not own the stock before the transaction, he
did own the stock after the transaction" rationale of these former cases. Instead, the court tested the transaction by asking whether the securities in
question were economically similar and thus would not give the insider a
trading advantage over the public. At first glance, it would appear that the
decision in Blau v. Mission Corp. radically broadened the criteria set forth
in Hodgkinson. There was a broadening; however, it took the form of
merely changing the standard for measuring the equality of the securities in
question. The fact that securities involved in an exchange are economic
equivalents may have little to do with their value as measured by the consideration investors are willing to pay to acquire them. Since it is the price of
the security that interests the speculator and perhaps not its underlying
worth, the Tide Water stock and the subsidiary stock were different
securities.
In Roberts v. Eaton, the second case arising in 1954, the defendant family
owned about forty-six percent of the Old Towne Corporation. Wishing
to dispose of their holdings in the corporation, the defendants decided
that a reclassification of the Old Towne stock would best effectuate this
end. After making full disclosure of the defendants' proposed sale and
53 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 115
(1954); 40 MINN. 1. REV. 79 (1955).
54 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); 68 HAzy. L. RV. 552 (1955);
58 MicH. L. REv. 749 (1955); 40 VA. L. REv. 797 (1954).
55 At the time of the second exchange, the defendant owned only sixty percent of Its

subsidiary. See Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347
1016 (1954).
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receiving stockholder approval of the reclassification plan, the corporation
reclassified all outstanding stock.G In the exchange all shareholders received a share of common stock and a share of preferred stock for each
share of common stock previously held. The exchange was held not within
section 16(b). The court enumerated three factors that precluded liability.
First, all shareholders participated in the exchange, not just the defendants.
Second, the sale was made only after full disclosure and stockholder approval of the exchange. Third, after reclassification, the defendants' interests continued proportionally unchanged. The court carefully emphasized
that the third factor alone would not have been sufficient to preclude liability. Thus, the Second Circuit again carefully broadened its interpretation of section 16(b) to bring about its stricter application. The Hodgkinson
case required only that the securities exchanged be economically similar, and
the Mission Corp. case further refined this rule. Roberts, however, emphasized that continuity of interest, a condition that equates the economic
equivalency test to the factual situation, would be insufficient to relieve
the defendant from liability. However, in the Roberts case this criterion
was necessary because had the court based its opinion solely on the defendants' interests continuing unchanged, it would have opened the door
for widespread abuse. In Hodgkinson, the defendant did not have control
of the corporation. In Roberts, however, the Eaton family could have easily
worked their will over the directors and the stockholders. Thus, the decision, although requiring more than Hodgkinson, did not make as radical
a departure as could be imagined.
In 1965, there were two decided cases involving the issue of whether
a purchase was made in an exchange of corporate securities.5T The important decision, a case previously discussed with the conversion cases,58
56 The reclassification was considered desirable to make the outstanding stock more
marketable. The reclassification of the stock in question changed all outstanding shares
of common stock of five dollars par value into the same number of common hars With
a one dollar par value. In addition, the shareholders received shares of preferred stock
in proportion to their holdings.
57 The second case, Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 259 F. Supp. 962 (SD.N.Y.
1965), adds little to the discussion. Briefly, the defendant, a Marquette Insider, owned
stock in the North American Cement Corporation. Pursuant to reorganization plan,%
North American sold its assets to Marquette and received in return 200,000 shares of
Marquette stock. North American was dissolved and the shares received distributed to
North American shareholders. The defendant sold the shares received within six months.

Holding that the receipt of the stock constituted a purchase, the court reasoned that
the defendant received something different after the exchange than he had held in the
North American stock.
the scope of Roberts v.
were not treated alike.
by any prior court. As

The defendant's contention that the transaction came within
Eaton was quickly rejected because all Marquette shareholders
Clearly, this decision is in line with any standard enunciated
such, it fails to indicate any trend in the Second Circuit or in

reorganization transactions.
58

See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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was the Ninth Circuit decision in Blau v. Max Factor& Co.59 In Max Factor,
the court held that an exchange of stock was not a purchase within section
16(b) because the exchange did not interrupt the defendant's continuity
of investment. That is, the stock held by the defendants after the exchange
was, in most respects, a security similar to that held before the exchange.
And even though the defendants had control of the corporation, the court
felt this factor had little bearing on the disposition of the case. Under the
Park & Tilford rationale or a liberal application of the Hodgkinson standard, the defendants in Max Factor probably would have been liable
because they had complete control of the corporation. But, despite this
element of control, the result in Max Factormay have been the same under
the Mission Corp. rationale and perhaps even under the Roberts decision
because of the existence of other factors, i.e., the securities were economic
equivalents which were readily transferable and the common stock was
accepted by brokers for a market sale of the Class A stock.
The latest judicial expression of what constitutes a purchase in a securities exchange transaction is Blau v. Lamb,60 the decision discussed previously with the conversion cases. In two separate transactions, a purchase
was held to have been made when there was an exchange of the common
stock of one corporation for the convertible preferred stock of another
corporation, 61 while a purchase was held not to have been made in an
exchange of stock between a parent corporation and its closely held subsidiary. In the second exchange, Lamb Enterprises, an Air-Way Industries
insider and co-defendant in the suit, acquired from Lamb Industries shares
of Air-Way stock in exchange for shares in Lamb Industries. Lamb Enterprises owned about eighty-eight percent of Lamb Industries.0 2 The court
59 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
60 Civil No. 29940, 2d Cir., June 27, 1966. This is the same case discussed in the text
accompanying note 36 supra.
61 Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The defendants did not contest
this holding on appeal. In this transaction Air-Way Industries offered to the stockholders of Lamb Industries one share of its newly created convertible preferred stock
in exchange for five shares of Lamb Industries. The defendant, an Air-Way Industries'
insider, exchanged his stock in Lamb Industries for the preferred stock and subsequently sold the shares received within six months. Relying on Blau v. Hodgkinson,
the court said the defendant had a choice: retain his shares of Lamb Industries or
exchange them in accordance with the offer. Having chosen the latter, the defendant
received securities totally different than the securities he had given up. Blau v. Lamb,
supra at 154-55.
62 Lamb Enterprises, the parent corporation, owned eighty-eight percent of Lamb
Industries. Edward Lamb, a co-defendant, and members of his family owned about nine
percent of Lamb Industries while the remaining three percent was owned by employees
or former employees of Lamb Industries. See Blau v. Lamb, supra note 61. Lamb Enterprises was itself solely owned by Edward Lamb, members of his family and corporations
controlled by them. Lamb Enterprises was, in effect, the personal holding company for
the Lamb interests.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1966

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 10
SECTION 16(b)
reasoned that the rule announced in the first part of the Mission Corp.
decision, that is, that a transfer of stock to a wholly owned subsidiary does
not constitute a sale within section 16(b),63 was not applicable where the
subsidiary was ninety-seven percent owned by both defendants and members
of the Lamb family.64 The court failed to give a standard by which future
courts could determine the amount of control necessary to invoke this
rule; however, it was felt that the unity of interest between the defendants
Lamb and Lamb Enterprises, and Lamb Industries was not sufficiently
affected by this transfer of securities to apply the sanctions of section 16(b).
Although the decision in Lamb restricted the rule laid down in Mission
Corp. by extending the exemption provided, the Lamb rule itself must be
restricted to the situation where one party, in this case the defendant Lamb,
has complete corporate control of the parent corporation and its subsidiary.6 5 As such, the narrowing interpretation of section 16(b) provided by
the Lamb decision does not radically change the Mission Corp. rule. In a
like manner, the Lamb decision does not radically change Mission Corp.'s
rationale. In both cases, the transactions were tested by the question of
whether the exchange gave the insider a trading advantage because of inside information.
With the exception of the Lamb case, some later decisions appear to
broaden the application of section 16(b) by setting forth a more objective
rule. The Mission Corp. decision held that mere economic equivalence of
the securities involved in an exchange will not defeat the sanctions of section 16(b). The Roberts decision then refined this rule. However, because
of the Lamb decision, the rationale of these decisions, i.e., that the existence
of certain factors precludes or does not preclude liability under section 16(b),
may no longer be valid-at least in the Second Circuit. Furthermore, the
Ninth Circuit, in the Max Factor decision, applied a rationale that is
similar to that in Lamb. Thus, it may well be that the more objective approach, with the exception of the decisions in Heli-Coil,Petteys and Western
Auto Supply Co., has become an insignificant factor in section 16(b) reasoning.
D. Put and Call Options
A "Calr' is an option contract paid for by the buyer upon delivery of
the contract, giving him the right, at his option, to buy from the maker or
63 The district court, in Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), reasoned that
it could not extend the exemption allowed in the exchange of securities between a
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary to the situation where the parent
corporation owned only eighty-eight percent of the subsidiary.
64 See note 62 supra.
65 Furthermore, the parent corporation in Mission Corp. owned only sixty percent

of its subsidiary, while in Lamb the parent owned nearly ninety percent of its subsidiary.
See note 55 supra.
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seller of such contract a certain number of shares of stock at a fixed price
on or before a stipulated date. 66 A "Put" is an option contract paid for by

the buyer upon delivery of the contract, giving him the right, at his option,
to deliver to the maker or seller of the contract a certain number of shares
of stock at a fixed price on or before a stipulated date.0 7 These option
contracts are often used as a medium for speculation. They are exercisable
at the option of the holder who will generally exercise the option only if
it is to his advantage to do so.68 Although there is little resemblance be-

tween these option contracts and employee compensation warrants, the
decision in Silverman v. Landa,6 9 the only decided case dealing with puts
and calls, was reasoned from the recent warrant case of Blatt v. Ogsbury.70
66 FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS 24-25

(1959).

67 Id. at 20-21.
68 Id. at 14-15.
69 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
70 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954). This case arose from an insider's acquisition of war.
rants issued by a corporation as part consideration under an employment contract. The
employment contract was entered into in 1941. The insider agreed to exercise the warrants in 1945, and he paid the consideration for the warrants in 1948. The court was
presented with the issue of when the defendant purchased the underlying securities,
i.e., the stock received upon the exercise of the option. It was reasoned that the purchase was made when the defendant incurred an irrevocable liability to purchase the
stock in 1945, because that was when the rights and obligations of the defendant be.
came fixed and the place in time that any trading advantage would begin.
The Ogsbury decision was preceded by three warrant cases that turned on the question
of when the rights were purchased by the insider within the meaning of § 16(b). By
way of dictum, the court in Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y, 1948) said
that a purchase of the warrants was made at the time of their actual issuance to the
defendant. In 1951, a California district court applied equitable principles in holding
the defendant not liable when he concurrently exercised the options received under
an employment contract and sold a portion of the stock received to raise the conslderation needed to exercise the options. Consolidated Eng'r Corp. v. Nesbit, 102 F. Supp.
112 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
One year after Truncale, the Second Circuit held, in Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949), that an acquisition of shareholder warrants
by an insider did not constitute a purchase within § 16(b). The court analogized the
issuance of the warrants to a stock dividend saying that when all shareholders are
treated alike, the insider could not possibly use his position to the detriment of the
other shareholders. This decision limited the earlier Park & Tilford decision because
here, as in Park & Tilford, the defendant did not have to accept the warrants, but
once he did, he became bound not to sell them, or the underlying securities if the warrants were exercised, within six months.
For an analysis of the inequities and inconsistencies in the judicial treatment of
stock options, see Hardee, Stock Options and the "Insider Trading' Provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act, 65 HaRv. L. REv. 997 (1952).
The Ogsbury decision, and its "rights and obligations" doctrine, has also been adopted
as the governing rationale in a case involving a contract to purchase securities. In
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), remanded for
further findings, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956), on remand,
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In Silverman, the defendant, a Fruehauf Trailer Company insider, issued
two call options of 500 shares each and one put option of 500 shares. The
options were to expire one year from the date of issue. The call options
were never exercised and the put option was exercised more than six months
after its issuance. In holding the simultaneous issuance of a put and call not to
be a purchase and sale of the underlying securities, the court reasoned that,
"By its nature, the option is one-sided; it fixes the obligation, but not the
rights of the issuer. Landa (the defendant) cannot be said to have 'sold' or
'purchased' Fruehauf stock; should the options lapse unexercised... no
change in his beneficial ownership of the underlying security would occur.'"'
Thus, only if both the put and call options were exercised within six months
would there have been a purchase and sale of the underlying stock. In the
recent warrant case of Blau v. Ogsbury,72 on which the court in Silverman
heavily relied, the court said the insider purchased the securities when his
rights and obligations were fixed. The Silverman court denied liability because the rights of the insider were not fixed; however, the optionor of a
put and call contract has no rights under the contract that could possibly
affect his trading advantage. Thus, denying liability on this ground appears
to make a great departure from the Smolowe rationale and, perhaps more
importantly, the warrant cases.73 Conceptually, there was no purchase and
sale of the underlying securities within six months. However, under the
more objective approach of Smolowe, the statutory definition of purchase
and sale would probably control, i.e., a contract to buy and a contract to
sell.7 4 To date, the courts have not decided the applicability of section 16(b)
when the insider acquires a put or call option. The issue may be resolved
in Miller v. General Outdoor Advertising CoY5 on remand from the Second
Circuit.
149 F. Supp. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 US.
914 (1959), the defendant, a Kaiser-Frazer insider, contracted to purchase KaiserFrazer stock. Because of insuflicient funds, the contract provided that the defendant
should use best efforts to borrow the money and if it was unable to obtain the loan.
it could terminate the contract. The court held the purchase date to be that time when
the defendant's rights and obligations were fixed, iae., when the parties had executed
the contract. 232 F.2d at 301. This reasoning may be insignificant, however, because the
court placed considerable weight on the fact that the defendant did not become an
insider until he had executed the contract. Ibid. In 1964, the court in Booth v. Varian
Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965), modified the
Stella decision. The Booth court held that the existence of a mutually binding contract
may not necessarily constitute a purchase of the stock by the buyer if the facts show
the purchaser to have no investment position in the securities until a time after the
contract had been made.
71 Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1962).
72 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954).
73 See note 70 supra

74 See text accompanying notes 24, 25 supra. But see text accompanying note 26 supra.
75 337 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964). The plaintiffs to this suit are contending that
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III. CONCLUSION
At one time, Smolowe and Park & Tilford were said to reflect the objective approach in the construction of section 16(b). The Ferraiolodecision,
however, made a significant inroad into the rationale of these cases by
reasoning that certain factors made it impossible for the insider to use
inside information for an unfair trading advantage. Later, the decisions in
Max Factor and Roberts redefined the rule purportedly set forth in Ferraiolo.
But, these inroads into the objective approach were not widely accepted.
The decisions in Heli-Coil and Western Auto Supply Co. returned to the
more objective approach by a rationale perhaps even more dogmatic than
that laid down in Smolowe. In Heli-Coil, the court dearly indicated that
any transaction that could, under any set of circumstances, be brought
within the ambit of section 16(b) would be subject to its sanctions regardless of whether the transaction could have been used for unfair insider
trading. In Western Auto Supply Co., the court used a similar rationale in
looking to the plain meaning of sale when the facts of the case made liability
necessary even under the more subjective view. However, this recent return
to the objective view was short-lived. The Second Circuit, in the Lamb
case, redefined and clarified the Ferraiolorule in a decision that represents
a truly subjective approach. Section 16(b) expressly provides that profits
are recoverable by the corporation irrespective of the intent of the insider
-thus the reference to the objective measure of proof.70 But the Lamb
decision does not require an inquiry into the insider's intent. Instead, it
requires an inquiry into the transaction to determine whether it could have
been used for profit based on inside information. And if it is found that the
transaction could have been so used, the inquiry ends and liability is imposed. On the other hand, if the transaction could not have been a vehicle
for profit based on inside information, the sanctions are not imposed. The
approach is still objective; the plaintiff need only show that the defendant,
under any set of circumstances, could have used the transaction for the
purposes the section sought to proscribe.
The Lamb decision has taken a step forward in clarifying the Second
Circuit's interpretation of purchase and sale under section 16(b). As such,
the Lamb rationale has discarded the rationale in Roberts and Mission
Corp. which had looked primarily to the factors of insider control and
economic equivalence as determinative of the cases. Perhaps more important, the Lamb decision may have discredited the rationale in the gift cases
of Truncale and Shaw in which an element of subjective proof exists.
the put and call options are in themselves equity securities. If it is decided that they

are not equity securities, the issue of purchase and sale may not be decided.
76 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.

751 (1943).
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There can be no doubt that the rationale in Lamb is sound. In a like
manner, the recent dogmatic decisions in Hell-Coil and Western Auto Supply Co. misconstrued the "crude rule of thumb" set forth by the draftsmen.7? The section intended an objective measure of proof but this does
not mean they intended a rigid rule of law. Proof is evidence that a set of
facts exist or do not exist. A rule of law should answer to reason, not convenience or simplicity.
L. D. V., III
77 Ibid.
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